

## Message Text

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AMCONSUL ZAGREB

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR YU

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S REMARKS ON "FACE THE NATION"  
CONCERNING YUGOSLAVIA

1. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, FOLLOWING IS FULL TEXT OF  
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS CONCERNING YUGOSLAVIA WHICH OCCURRED  
DURING THE APPEARANCE OF THE SECRETARY ON "FACE THE  
NATION" ON CBS/TV ON OCTOBER 24, 1976.

1. BEGIN EXCERPT.

MR. HERMAN: MR. SECRETARY, LAST JULY YOU SAID PUBLICLY  
WHAT YOU HAD, I GATHER, BEEN SAYING PRIVATELY FOR SOME  
TIME -- NAMELY, THAT JIMMY CARTER'S POLICIES TO THAT POINT  
WERE FAIRLY CONSISTENT WITH THE POLICIES OF THE FORD  
ADMINISTRATION. I BELIEVE YOU CALLED THE POLICIES OF THE  
CARTER AND FORD PEOPLE "COMPATIBLE". DO YOU STILL THINK,  
THESE MANY MONTHS LATER, THAT THE TWO POLICIES ARE  
COMPATIBLE?

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SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, FIRST, I MADE THAT COMMENT WHEN GOVERNOR CARTER HAD GIVEN EXACTLY ONE SPEECH ON FOREIGN POLICY, AND HE HAD NOT YET EXPOSED THE FULL COMPLEXITY OF HIS THOUGHT. I WOULD SAY NOW THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT

AREAS OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HIS STATEMENTS AND OUR POLICY.

MR. HERMAN: WELL, MR. SECRETARY, I GUESS I'M IN THE POSITION OF A QUESTIONER WHOSE NEXT QUESTION HAS BEEN PRETTY WELL DETERMINED BY YOUR FIRST ANSWER. YOU SAY THERE ARE A NUMBER OF DIFFERENCES NOW BETWEEN THE FORD ADMINISTRATION POLICIES AND THOSE ENUNCIATED BY GOVERNOR CARTER, AND I GUESS THE NEXT THING TO DO IS TO FAIRLY QUICKLY LIST THEM.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WE WOULD HAVE A DIFFERENCE IN ATTITUDE TOWARDS COMMUNIST PARTICIPATION IN THE GOVERNMENTS OF EUROPE. WE WOULD HAVE A DIFFERENCE WITH RESPECT TO ARMS SALES TO MANY COUNTRIES, BECAUSE OUR VIEW WOULD BE THAT IF WE CANNOT BE THE WORLD'S POLICEMAN AND IF WE CANNOT SELL ARMS TO THREATENED COUNTRIES, THEN THERE IS BOUND TO BE A VACUUM THAT SOMEBODY IS GOING TO FILL.

THERE IS A DIFFERENCE IN THE ATTITUDES TOWARDS COUNTRIES -- FOR EXAMPLE, LIKE KENYA AND ZAIRE. THERE IS A DIFFERENCE WITH THE DEGREE OF EXPLICITNESS WITH WHICH WE SHOULD STATE WHAT WE WILL OR WILL NOT DO IN THE CASE OF CERTAIN CONTINGENCIES, SUCH AS CAME UP WITH RESPECT TO YUGOSLAVIA. AND THERE IS A DIFFERENCE ABOUT THE LEVEL OF THE DEFENSE EXPENDITURES.

MR. BRADSHAW: DO YOU THINK THAT THE SUGGESTION OF NOT BEING WILLING TO DEFEND YUGOSLAVIA IN THE CASE OF A SOVIET ATTACK REALLY INCREASES THE DANGER OF AN ATTACK? YOU MENTIONED THIS AS ONE OF THE PROBLEMS. HOW CAN YOU DRAW A LINE AROUND THE WORLD AND SAY THAT WE WILL STAND AT CERTAIN PLACES, OR NOT DRAW THE LINE, AS HAS BEEN SUGGESTED -- AS GOVERNOR CARTER DID?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: WELL, I THINK IT IS DANGEROUS TO  
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STATE THAT CERTAIN COUNTRIES ARE OUTSIDE THE AMERICAN DEFENSE PERIMETER IF THOSE COUNTRIES ARE OF A GREAT STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE AND WHEN IT IS GENERALLY RECOGNIZED THAT THEIR CHANGE IN ALIGNMENT WOULD HAVE SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES.

IN 1949, A NUMBER OF THEN ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS WERE DRAWING A LINE THIS WAY WHICH LEFT KOREA OUTSIDE THE

PERIMETER. WHETHER THAT IN FACT CONTRIBUTED TO THE ATTACK ON KOREA, WE DO NOT KNOW. WHAT WE DO KNOW IS THAT IN 1950, WHEN THE ATTACK OCCURRED, THE ADMINISTRATION HAD TO CHANGE ITS VIEW.

MY CONCERN IS THAT NO MISCALCULATION ARISE. SIX

ADMINISTRATIONS, STARTING WITH PRESIDENT TRUMAN -- THREE DEMOCRATIC AND THREE REPUBLICAN -- HAVE DECLARED THAT THE INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY AND NON-ALIGNMENT OF YUGOSLAVIA ARE MAJOR AMERICAN INTERESTS. THIS IS A VIEW UNANIMOUSLY SHARED BY ALL OF OUR WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES, AND I BELIEVE THAT IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE OTHER SIDE UNDERSTAND THAT PRESSURE ON YUGOSLAVIA WOULD HAVE GRAVE CONSEQUENCES FOR THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES, WITHOUT SPELLING OUT WHAT EXACTLY WE WOULD DO, AND THAT THE BIPARTISAN CONSENSUS THAT HAS EXISTED WITH RESPECT TO THIS ISSUE BE RESTORED AS RAPIDLY AS WE CAN DO IT.

MR. SCHIEFFER: MR. SECRETARY, ARE YOU SUGGESTING THEN THAT BY SAYING THAT AN INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA WOULD NOT DIRECTLY THREATEN THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES, THAT GOVERNOR CARTER WAS ISSUING AN INVITATION TO THE SOVIET UNION --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: NO.

MR. SCHIEFFER: -- TO TAKE SOME ACTION THERE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I AM SURE THAT THAT WAS NOT HIS INTENTION, AND I'M POSITIVE THAT IF HE WERE TO BE ELECTED AND LOOKED AT THE FACTS THAT HE WOULD RECONSIDER THAT STATEMENT. I BELIEVE THAT IF THE STATEMENT WERE LEFT TO UNCLASSIFIED

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STAND IT WOULD RAISE SERIOUS AMBIGUITIES. IT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE ENTIRE POSTWAR POLICY OF EVERY DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN ADMINISTRATION, INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE VIEWS OF OUR WEST EUROPEAN ALLIES, AND WOULD BE DANGEROUS IF IT BECAME AMERICAN POLICY.

MR. BRADSHER: WELL, SIR --

MR. SCHIEFFER: LET ME JUST FOLLOW UP A MINUTE, HENRY.

YOU'RE NOT SUGGESTING THAT IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCE THE UNITED STATES WOULD ACTUALLY SEND TROOPS TO YUGOSLAVIA IF SOMETHING LIKE THAT AROSE?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I'M SUGGESTING THAT FOR THE UNITED

STATES TO SPELL OUT EXACTLY WHAT IT WILL DO IN CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH NO ONE CAN YET FORESEE IS UNWISE. I'M SAYING ALSO THAT TO DECLARE A COUNTRY OF THE GEOGRAPHIC AND STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF YUGOSLAVIA AS LYING OUTSIDE AN AMERICAN SECURITY INTEREST, HOWEVER WE MAY WANT TO VINDICATE THAT INTEREST, IS DANGEROUS, INCONSISTENT WITH OUR NATO POLICIES AND, THEREFORE -- IN FOREIGN POLICY, THE ART OF FOREIGN POLICY IS TO PREVENT CRISES FROM ARISING AND

NOT TO CREATE AMBIGUITIES WHICH THE OPPONENT MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO PROBE.

END EXCEPT.

3. BEGIN EXCERPT.

MR. SCHIEFFER: MR. SCHLESINGER, THE FORMER DEFENSE SECRETARY, WHEN HE CAME BACK FROM CHINA RECENTLY, SAID WE SHOULD NOT REJECT OUT OF HAND ANY REQUEST FOR ARMS SALES TO CHINA, IF THAT SHOULD COME ABOUT. WOULD YOU AGREE WITH THAT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: THIS IS ONE OF THOSE ISSUES THAT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO ANSWER IN THE ABSTRACT. IT WOULD DEPEND ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES, ON THE IMMINENCE OF THE THREAT, ON HOW IMPORTANT WE THOUGHT THE THREAT WAS TO OUR SECURITY. UNCLASSIFIED

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BUT CERTAINLY WE WOULD TAKE AN EXTREMELY DIM VIEW OF A MILITARY ATTACK, OR EVEN MILITARY PRESSURE, ON CHINA.

MR. SCHIEFFER: WELL, DO YOU REALLY SEE ANY POSSIBILITY OF THAT, ANY REAL POSSIBILITY OF THAT COMING ABOUT?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: IT IS THE TASK OF FOREIGN POLICY TO PREPARE AGAINST CONTINGENCIES AND TO LOWER TEMPTATIONS ON THE OTHER SIDE. I DO NOT THINK IT IS A PROBABILITY. I THINK THAT ANY AMERICAN POLICYMAKER, GIVEN THE IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUES THAT WOULD BE RAISED, WOULD HAVE TO TAKE IT INTO ACCOUNT.

MR. BRADSHAW: IS THIS THE SAME CATEGORY AS YUGOSLAVIA? CAN YOU RELATE THE TWO?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I THINK THERE ARE TWO KINDS OF AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE WORLD. THERE ARE INTERESTS WHERE WE HAVE A FORMAL LEGAL OBLIGATION, LIKE IN NATO. THEN THERE ARE INTERESTS WHERE THE IMPORTANCE OF A COUNTRY IS SUCH THAT WHETHER WE HAVE AN OBLIGATION OR NOT, WE

MIGHT FEEL OUR SECURITY AFFECTED.

I THINK THE PROBLEM IS COMPARABLE AS BETWEEN CHINA AND YUGOSLAVIA IN THE SENSE THAT AN ATTACK, A SUCCESSFUL ATTACK ON EITHER, WOULD AFFECT THE WORLD EQUILIBRIUM AND WOULD AFFECT THE CALCULATIONS OF OTHER COUNTRIES, AND THEREFORE COULD IN TIME AFFECT AMERICAN SECURITY, EVEN IF IT DIDN'T DO SO IMMEDIATELY. AND IT IS THE TASK OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY NOT TO PLAN NOW HOW WE ARE GOING TO CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS, BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO AVOID,

NOR HAVE WE EVER SAID THAT THAT IS WHAT WE WOULD DO. WHAT WE ARE TRYING TO DO IS TO PREVENT THE SITUATION FROM COMING ABOUT.

END EXCERPT. KISSINGER

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